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1 Hili Razinsky’s book aims to investigate the philosophical notion of ambivalence and to
support  an  anti-irrationalist,  non-contradictory,  and  anti-dichotomic  perspective  of
this  notion.  The  book  is  hardly  ascribable  to  an  explicit  philosophical  tradition:  it
includes  references  to  both continental  and analytic  philosophers  (from Heidegger,
Husserl, and Sartre, to Davidson and Freud, among many others). Razinsky also offers
examples  taken  from  literary  works  to  corroborate  her  replies  to  the  following
questions: what is ambivalence? What character does it assume? How is ambivalence to
be understood? Is it rational or irrational? How is ambivalence expressed, and how is it
recognized? 
2 The volume consists of nine chapters divided into three parts. Chapters 4, 5, 8, and 9
are partial or total re-workings of previous articles by the same author. The appendix
chapter  is  a  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  “inherent  ambivalence”  and
“contingent ambivalence.” 
3 The first chapter is essential for the reader to attain an overview of the ambivalence
issue.  Razinsky provides a general definition of ambivalence involving key concepts
such  as  intentionality,  attitude,  mind,  and  rationality.  All  over  the  book,  these  same
concepts are alternatively focused upon to show the main philosophical perspectives
on ambivalence.
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4 Razinsky’s definition of ambivalence refers to the mental and behavioral attitudes of
human beings. According to the author, an ambivalent person is a person who “holds
two  opposed  mental  attitudes  toward  one  and  the  same  object”  (p. 16).  However,
maintaining two opposing attitudes is not necessarily the expression of a split subject;
this condition, instead, means that the subject herself is ambivalent in the sense that
she expresses a plurality in the unity of her being. This interpretation intentionally
prevents us from considering ambivalence as an irrational character of the subject as
something that goes against schemes of rationality and coherence. Ambivalence is not a
contradictory phenomenon, as Razinsky wishes to stress as early as in the introduction:
“The main thought behind this book is that if human lives are in fact often ambivalent,
this  may  be  conceived  as  an  invitation  to  rethink  our  notions  of  personhood  and
rationality, as well as those of mental attitude, desire, judgment, emotion, action, and
consciousness.” (4).
5 This book aims to rethink acquired notions through an overall study of ambivalence.
The  latter  is  unconventionally  understood  as  a  side  of  subjectivity,  that  is,  of  a
“psychophysical creature and by the same token a subject – the subject is a person”
(28). On this point, the question that Razinsky’s book poses concerns both concepts of
subjectivity and person. These concepts are taken up by the author in an instrumental
way to develop her thesis of the ambivalent character of human existence. However, in
contrast  to  her  main thought  to  rethinking notions,  these  concepts  turn out  to  be
rather unexplored or too simplified. The author justifies with the scope of the book her
choice not to problematize the subject/person distinction. She intends to address the
main features of ambivalence specifically.  However,  to dismiss these notions with a
footnote seems a bit too limited all the more that ambivalent persons and their mental
and behavioral attitudes are constantly addressed. This lack of deepening also affects
other notions frequently utilized by the author, such as intention, attitudes, and mental
attitudes.  As Razinsky argues, her understanding of intentionality is in line with the
conceptions  of  Davidson  and  Husserl.  In  particular,  intentionality  means  the
manifestation  of  a  person’s  subjectivity  (21).  The  example  Razinsky  uses  is  that  of
someone who loves someone else or who does something. To love and to do something
are two intentional aspects of human life, and this means that the person intends to
love or intends to do that thing. “If a cluster of thoughts, actions, and so on has the
meaning of a certain attitude of love, it is the person herself who ‘means’ it as such, and
it is from her point of view that this cluster takes the direction of love or constitutes a
tendency that is love.” (21). So that mental attitudes and actions, as well as many other
mental and behavioral aspects, are intentional. 
6 As the author further specifies, the book deals mainly with mental attitudes. But what
are mental attitudes, or even, as Razinsky simplifies, what are attitudes? An attitude,
she argues,  is  “a  disposition to  behavior  and consciousness”  (22).  According to  the
author, a disposition implies an outlook, and this shows its intentional character, as it is
towards  something  or  someone  (22).  Moreover,  attitudes  are  not  necessarily
acknowledged.  They  are  constituted  together  with  their  behavioral  and  conscious
expressions. However, attitudes, behavior, and other engagements “which are not at
the  particular  time  experienced  as  these  attitudes  or  behavior”  are  distinct  from
“thoughts, conscious actions, conscious attitudes” (29-30). In a nutshell, attitudes are
intentional dispositions conscious or unconscious, towards something or someone. The
adjective mental used for attitudes seems to have an extremely generic value because
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the intentionality that characterizes attitudes implies basic rationality that connects
attitudes to the mental interconnections of the subject. In this perspective, the subject
is a creature engaged in “multiple ways.” “The sense in human life is hence bound with
a soft identity of mental attitudes, which is to say that while a person’s attitude is in a
sense defined by its interlinkages with behavior and consciousness, further attitudes,
and other engagements,  it  also transcends any definition and is  essentially open to
redefinition.” (24).
7 The  author  defines  the  mind  as  “the  person’s  array  of  mental  attitudes,  [which]
captures  a  focal  part  of  the  person’s  intentionality”  (25).  Here  again,  the  adjective
mental seems to be used too vaguely. On the one hand, the realm of the mind is not
reducible to intentionality, and therefore to mental attitudes; while on the other hand,
it is attributed to the character dispositions as well as to other aspects that constitute
the “matter-of-course background” of the subject’s engagements.
8 The  second  chapter  is  programmatic  for  the  author  presents  three  clusters  of
philosophical issues concerning ambivalence she will be dealing with in the following
chapters. The first cluster concerns the thesis that ambivalence is not possible because
it  implies  the  idea  of  a  person  with  two  opposing  attitudes.  Addressing  this
philosophical  problem, the author compares her  approach to  ambivalence with the
multiplicity approach proposed by Harry Frankfurt in The Faintest Passion (1992), and with
Davidson’s conception of personhood as a matter of basic rationality. The multiplicity
approach  can  either  means  that  the  subject  is  a  subject  only  until  she  becomes
ambivalent,  or  that  she is  essentially  a  plural  creature.  In this  perspective,  in both
cases,  ambivalence  is  not  compatible  with  the  idea  of  a  unitary  subject.  Frankfurt
adopts the first meaning, considering ambivalence as the annihilation of the subject. In
Davidson’s perspective, instead, mental unity consists of “the rational interrelation and
consistency  of  attitudes”  (39).  Davidson  speaks  of  two  quasi-subjects to  frame
contrasting or inconsistent attitudes of a person. According to Frankfurt and Davidson,
the mental unity of subjects requires a minimum level of consistency. This hypothesis
is problematic to the author, for she maintains that ambivalence involves both unity
and  multiplicity  at  the  same  time.  As Razinsky  will  explain  better  in  chapter 7,
ambivalence  involves  basic  rationality  and  a  unitary  subject.  However,  even  if  the
unitary subjects have a plurality of attitudes, these attitudes do not divide the subject
into quasi-subjects, nor do they confer an irrational character to ambivalence. Subjects
cope daily with contrasting attitudes that characterize their personalities (see 174-87).
9 As for the second philosophical problem, which is the idea that ambivalent behavior
makes people incapable of  acting,  the author believes that from mutually exclusive
behaviors and desires it does not follow that ambivalent behavior is the combination of
two conflicting practical conclusions, but only that: “ambivalence is a challenge for our
conduct-one to which we respond in all sort of resourceful ways. […] Ambivalence often
involves  creative  compromise  behavior  that  forms  an  ambivalent  yet  substantial
direction in the person’s life. Ambivalence allows for compromise action,  in which we
jointly fulfill both opposed desires.” (49, 51).
10 The  second  part  of  the  book  goes  from  chapter 3  to  6.  In  this  section,  Razinsky
examines  the  relationships  between  emotional  ambivalence  and  the  notions  of
subjectivity and agency.  She supports an idea of  a  person as unity in plurality and
considers ambivalence as a central feature of mental unity (chapter 3). Then the author
devotes herself to the analysis of ambivalence from a behavioral perspective. According
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to her, emotional ambivalence constitutes: “a wider complex that cannot be reduced to
two independent emotional complexes” (61). Her definition of emotional ambivalence
relies on Philip J. Koch’s article “Emotional Ambivalence” (1987). According to Koch,
emotions are complexes of bodily feelings, attentional sets, evaluations/judgments, and
desires/impulses/inclinations to behave. In other words, emotions are everything that
can fit into an opposition situation. Razinsky integrates Koch’s conception of emotions
with the feature of intentionality: emotions are understood as “mental attitudes toward
objects”  (63).  Thus,  she  can  speak  of  a  unity  in  plurality  that  consists  of  keeping
together conflicting emotions with other mental interlinkages. Such unity in plurality
is circumscribed, however, by the “phenomena and language of ambivalence and of the
mind” (67), that is to say, “it is in terms of interlinkages involved in the ambivalence
that particular instances can be understood and that levels and aspects of integration
can be described” (76). 
11 The author adopts a very naïve notion of subjectivity that includes the idea of unity in
plurality together with a basic understanding of the human being as a unitary subject.
At the same time, however, Razinsky also states that this notion of subjectivity is not
sufficient to sustain the idea of unity in plurality, because unity is “neither simple nor
quasi-simple.”  Therefore,  “to  take  the  human  being  or  mind  for  a  simple  unity  is
tantamount to denying ambivalence” (67). 
12 At this point, Razinsky introduces the concept of engagement to try to make her idea of
ambivalence  succeed.  Engagement  is  defined  in  a  footnote  as  “the  concrete
manifestations of subjectivity or as the intentional aspects of a person’s life” (77), and it
includes “attitudes,  thoughts,  sensations,  acts,  and other mental elements (behavior
included)” (67). She then offers an implemented definition of ambivalence that includes
the subject’s plurality of engagements. This definition applies to the mind understood
in terms of the totality of engagements,  or totality of attitudes.  Although the same
phenomenon of ambivalence “implies a cognitive relevance” (70), however, the author
strategically uses again the concept of mind to hold together heterogeneous elements
without providing a sufficient analysis of it. She just refers to the Davidsonian notion of
mental holism, comparing the idea of unity in plurality with what Davidson calls “the
person’s engagements as basically or constitutively rational” (68).
13 In chapter 5, the author addresses the theme of conscious subjectivity. She states that
the term consciousness refers in her book “to more or less momentary consciousness or
to particular aspects of such moments” (99). In a footnote, she specifies that momentary
is to be intended as “more or less momentary,” or rather what is called “the specious
present” (125). This is a too hasty way to solve the complex issue of consciousness, even
more so by invoking the notion of “specious present,” which constitutes a problematic
issue itself. The author uses this extremely general definition of consciousness to refer
to  the  way  in  which  momentary  consciousness  takes  time  as  part  of  an  “ongoing
consciousness,” in order to argue that “intentional experiences and intentional aspects
of  experience  would  be  conscious  engagements  or  aspects  of  a  consciousness
differentiated as to how the consciousness goes out” (115). 
14 Chapters  6  and 7  are  dedicated respectively  to  Razinsky’s  comparison between the
concept of unity in plurality and the concepts of harmonious unity and harmonization
–  in  this  regard,  she  refers  to  Freud’s  notion  of  personhood;  to  the  issue  of  self-
deception and ambivalent beliefs. In the last two chapters, the author finally responds
to the idea of the impossibility of ambivalence concerning the notions of truth and
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value,  which  represents  the  third  cluster  of  philosophical  problems  introduced  in
chapter 2.
15 Razinsky’s  attempt  to  maintain  an  anti-reductionist  approach  to  the  complex
phenomenon of ambivalence is undoubtedly interesting. Her effort to distinguish the
phenomenon  of  ambivalence  from  its  logical  interpretation,  which  identifies
ambivalence with self-contradiction, is appreciable. This distinction is highlighted in
chapter 4,  dedicated to  ambivalent  behavior.  The author  tries  to  illustrate  that  the
conflict between opposing behavioral inclinations does not imply contradictory desires,
but rather there is a vagueness that accompanies ambivalence. However, once again, a
problematic notion such as vagueness is not adequately investigated. 
16 Reading this book gives the impression that the promising intentions of the author
have turned out to be more complicated than expected in their realization, which is
perhaps the reason why it is not fully successful. Razinsky’s attempt to preserve the
complexity of the phenomenon of ambivalence leads the author to persist on a very
general  level  of  reflection with respect  to  the  multiple  dimensions  involved in  the
human phenomenon of ambivalence. The book would have been much more interesting
if the author had shown a greater sensitivity to the problematization of concepts. The
unproblematic way in which she accepts concepts conflicts with her insisting on the
need of a complex theoretical framework to any consistent discussion on ambivalence.
The  conceptual  problematization  would  have  made  Razinsky’s  book  a  relevant
contribution to the debate on ambivalence. But unfortunately, this was not the case. A
number of the key concepts used to discuss ambivalence would have required much
more  in-depth  work,  in  particular,  the  notions  of  mind,  emotion,  engagement,
vagueness (attributed to behavior (86)), and consciousness. Razinsky admits that some
definitions  of  the  concepts  she  currently  uses  are  not  sufficient  to  describe
ambivalence, but she keeps adopting them in order to avoid deviating from her main
focus. In conclusion, although the author’s intention is remarkable, the book does not
fully satisfy the reader who wants to get an idea of the phenomenon of ambivalence
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